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a  b  s  t  r  a  c  t
The  paper  explores  some  mechanisms  of  corporate  governance  (ownership  and  board  characteristics)
in  Spanish  listed  companies  and  their impact  on  the  likelihood  of  ﬁnancial  distress.  An  empirical  study
was  conducted  between  2007  and  2012  using  a  matched-pairs  research  design  with  308  observations,
with  half  of  them  classiﬁed  as distressed  and  non-distressed.  Based  on the  previous  study by  Pindado,
Rodrigues,  and  De  la Torre  (2008), a broader  concept  of  bankruptcy  is  used  to  deﬁne  business  failure.
Employing  several  conditional  logistic  models,  as well  as  to other  previous  studies  on  bankruptcy,  the
results  conﬁrm  that  in difﬁcult  situations  prior to  bankruptcy,  the  impact  of  board  ownership  and  propor-
tion  of  independent  directors  on business  failure  likelihood  are  similar  to  those  exerted  in more  extreme
situations.  These  results  go  one  step  further,  to offer  a  negative  relationship  between  board  size  and  the
likelihood  of  ﬁnancial  distress.  This result  is interpreted  as a  form  of  creating  diversity  and to  improve  the
access  to  the  information  and  resources,  especially  in  contexts  where  the  ownership  is highly concen-
trated  and  large  shareholders  have  a great  power  to  inﬂuence  the board  structure.  However,  the  results
conﬁrm  that  ownership  concentration  does  not  have  a signiﬁcant  impact  on  ﬁnancial  distress  likelihood
in  the  Spanish  context.  It is  argued  that  large  shareholders  are  passive  as  regards  an  enhanced  monitoring
of  management  and, alternatively,  they  do not  have  enough  incentives  to hold back  the  ﬁnancial  distress.
These  ﬁndings  have  important  implications  in  the  Spanish  context,  where  several  changes  in the regula-
tory  listing  requirements  have  been  carried  out  with  respect  to corporate  governance,  and  where  there
is  no  empirical  evidence  regarding  this  respect.
©  2015  ASEPUC.  Published  by Elsevier  España,  S.L.U.  This  is  an  open  access  article  under  the  CC
BY-NC-ND  license  (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
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r  e  s  u  m  e  n
Este  trabajo  analiza  algunos  mecanismos  de  gobierno  corporativo  (propiedad  y  características  del  Con-
sejo  de  Administración)  en  las empresas  cotizadas  espan˜olas  y  su  impacto  sobre  las  probabilidades  de
fracaso  empresarial.  Usando  la  técnica  del emparejamiento,  se  lleva  a cabo  un  estudio  empírico  con  308
observaciones,  la  mitad  de  ellas  fracasadas  y  la  otra  mitad  no fracasadas  entre  2007  y 2012.  Sobre la  base
del estudio  de Pindado  et  al.  (2008),  se ha  usado  un concepto  amplio  de  fracaso  empresarial.  Empleandoalabras clave:
onsejo de administración
egresión logística condicional
obierno corporativo
racaso empresarial
oncentración de la propiedad
modelos  logísticos  condicionales,  y  adicionalmente  a otros  estudios  previos  sobre  fracaso  empresarial,
nuestros  resultados  conﬁrman  que  en situaciones  de  diﬁcultad  previas  a la  quiebra,  la propiedad  de los
consejeros  y  la  proporción  de  consejeros  independientes  ejercen  un  impacto  similar  sobre  la probabil-
idad  de  fracaso  empresarial  a  otras  situaciones  de fracaso  más  extremas.  Nuestros  resultados  van  más
allá al evidenciar  una  relación  negativa  entre  el  taman˜o  del  consejo  y la  probabilidad  de  fracaso  empre-
sarial.  Interpretamos  estos  resultados  como  una  forma  de  creación  de  diversidad  y mejorar  el  acceso  a
la información  y a  los  recursos,  especialmente  en  contextos  donde  la  propiedad  está  altamente  concen-
trada  y los  grandes  accionistas  tienen  un  gran  poder  de  inﬂuencia  en la  composición  de  la  estructura
∗ Corresponding author.
E-mail address: Montserrat.MLizano@uclm.es (M.  Manzaneque).
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138-4891/© 2015 ASEPUC. Published by Elsevier España, S.L.U. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/
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del consejo.  Sin  embargo,  los  resultados  conﬁrman  que la concentración  de  la  propiedad  no tiene  un efecto
signiﬁcativo  sobre  la  probabilidad  de  fracaso  empresarial  en  el contexto  espan˜ol.  Interpretamos  que  los
accionistas  mayoritarios  son pasivos  con  respecto  a una  mayor  vigilancia  de  la gestión  y alterativamente,
no tiene  suﬁcientes  incentivos  para  frenar  las  diﬁcultades  ﬁnancieras.  Estos  resultados  tienen  importantes
implicaciones  en  el contexto  espan˜ol  donde  se han  propuesto  cambios  en  los  requerimientos  relativos  al
gobierno  corporativo  y  donde  no hay  evidencia  empírica  a  este  respecto.
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A retrospective analysis of the economic and ﬁnancial crisis dur-
ng 2007–2013 period highlights the important consequences of
usinesses’ ﬁnancial distress on stakeholders (i.e. ﬁnancial cred-
tors, managers, shareholders, investors, employees, government
egulators and society in general). So, more than ever, the revi-
ion of ﬁnancial distress prediction models and the development
f models adapted to particular characteristics of countries have an
mportant role in order to prevent and manage these situations. In
his regard, the crisis has highlighted two important issues: (a) the
nability of the agencies credit ratings, governments and ﬁnancial
reditors to anticipate and prevent ﬁrms’ ﬁnancial distress situa-
ions (Enron 2001 or Lehman Brothers 2008, among others); and
b) the importance of effectiveness of corporate governance mech-
nisms in crisis contexts (Husson-Traore, 2009).
The analysis of the causes of ﬁnancial distress and the develop-
ent of robust and stable models of ﬁnancial distress prediction are
ar from a new issue. In fact, from 1960s the numerous ﬁnancial dis-
ress or bankruptcy prediction models developed are an extension
o seminal works of Beaver (1966, 1968), Altman (1968, 1982) or
hlson (1980), among others. The empirical debate about ﬁnancial
istress has focused on explanation power of ﬁnancial and account-
ng information (Altman, 1968, 1982; Beaver, 1966, 1968; Ohlson,
980; Zmijewski, 1984) applying diverse statistical methods (linear
iscriminant analysis, logistic analysis, probit analysis). However,
everal researchers argue that economic and ﬁnancial data alone
o not provide sufﬁcient predictive power of future insolvency,
eing therefore necessary to include variables representative of
wnership and/or corporate governance characteristics in order to
mprove the predictive power of models (Chang, 2009; Chen, 2008;
eng & Wang, 2006; Fich & Slezak, 2008; Lee & Yeh, 2004; Simpson
 Gleason, 1999; Wang & Deng, 2006).
In fact, from 1980s there is a large body of literature that high-
ights the importance of corporate governance and its inﬂuence
n the likelihood of ﬁnancial distress or bankruptcy (Chang, 2009;
haganti, Mahajan, & Sharma, 1985; Daily & Dalton, 1994a,b; Deng
 Wang, 2006; Donker, Santen, & Zahir, 2009; Fich & Slezak, 2008;
ajili & Zéghal, 2010). This is explained, according to the postu-
ates of Agency Theory, by the fact that conﬂict of interests on
he relationship between management and other stakeholders, by
elegating roles, is more severe in crisis because managers will
hoose a short-term strategy that results in higher private ben-
ﬁts, at the prospect of losing their jobs (Donker et al., 2009).
his managers’ behavior leads to an ethical conﬂict with share-
olders because they prioritize their personal aims against the
verall company objective, which is to maximize the value of
hares and ensure the company survival in the future. Despite
he extension of previous literature, it has been limited to cer-
ain context (U.S., Taiwan and China) and on bankruptcy or legal
rocesses of ﬁnancial distress (ex-post models). However, the cor-
orate governance mechanisms, ethics codes and legal systems
o control ﬁnancial distress situations differ from one country
o another, reasons why the extension of analysis to other geo-
raphic context and to other ﬁnancial distress situations different
o bankruptcy contributes to complement the existing literature.r  Elsevier  España,  S.L.U.  Este  es  un  artículo  Open  Access  bajo  la licencia  CC
BY-NC-ND  (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
Particularly, the special characteristics of corporate governance in
Spain (ownership concentration, unitary board system and volun-
tary good governance practices) likely raise serious agency conﬂicts
in ﬁnancial distress situations. In this sense, the analysis of rela-
tionship between corporate governance and companies’ ﬁnancial
distress for Spain provides evidence for this type of contexts, where
overall analysis of this issue is still lacking.
Accordingly, the development of corporate ﬁnancial distress’
explanation and forecast models, based on ownership, corporate
governance and accounting variables, would make a signiﬁcant
contribution to ﬁnancial and corporate governance literature. In
this sense, the questions answered by this research are: Are the
ownership concentration and directors’ ownership affecting the
likelihood of ﬁnancial distress in Spain? Which of the board char-
acteristics affect the ﬁnancial distress likelihood in the Spanish
market?
In order to answer these questions, the general objective of
this work is to validate the relationship between corporate gov-
ernance mechanisms (ownership and board characteristics) and
the likelihood of ﬁnancial distress for Spanish listed companies
where overall analysis of this issue is still lacking. To this end,
we used companies’ data between 2007 and 2012, and applied
conditional logistic regression analysis. Using an approximation to
Pindado, Rodrigues, and De la Torre’s (2008) study, we  considered
a company as “distressed” when it meets some of the following
conditions: (a) its earnings before interest and taxes, depreciation
and amortization (EBITDA) are lower than its ﬁnancial expenses for
two consecutive years; and/or, (b) a fall in its market value occurs
between two consecutive periods. So, we  used a broad concept of
business failure beyond the bankruptcy, previously recognized as
indicators of business failure (see Manzaneque (2006) for a major
revision), in order to overcome previous literature limitations on
this question (Mora, 1994).
Our study contributes to the literature in different ways. Previ-
ous literature analyzes the effect of corporate governance on ﬁrms’
bankruptcy (Deng & Wang, 2006; Lajili & Zéghal, 2010; Mangena &
Chamisa, 2008) and the obtained results document a negative and
signiﬁcant effect between board ownership and a strong corporate
governance system on business failure likelihood. In the same line
of the above studies, our results conﬁrm that in difﬁcult situation
previous to bankruptcy, the roles of board ownership and board
independence are similar to those exerted in more extreme situa-
tions as is the bankruptcy case. That is, following the Agency Theory
assumptions, the ownership of directors and independence of
board members, as factors that reduce principal-principal conﬂict
of interests that arises between majority and minority shareholders
and are common in concentrated contexts as the Spanish market,
are important to reduce the likelihood of failure. Our results go one
step further to offer a negative relationship between board size
and the likelihood of ﬁnancial distress. We  interpret this result as
a form of creative diversity and improve the access to the infor-
mation and resources, especially in contexts where the ownership
is highly concentrated and large shareholders have a great power
to inﬂuence in the board structure. Moreover, regarding owner-
ship structure, the results show that neither non-institutional nor
institutional shareholders’ ownership has any effect to reduce the
– Span
l
a
t
f
M
a
c
m
t
i
g
t
h
l
“
s
s
f
C
r
d
t
a
O
h
c
e
i
c
d
c
r
l
d
H
o
l
p
e
t
h
m
a
t
a
1
a
i
m
a
i
ﬁ
Y
t
ﬁM. Manzaneque et al. / Revista de Contabilidad 
ikelihood of business failure in the Spanish context. These results
re contrary to those of previous literature that support a nega-
ive relationship between ownership concentration and business
ailure likelihood (Donker et al., 2009; Elloumi & Gueyie, 2001;
angena & Chamisa, 2008; Parker, Gary, & Howard, 2002). We
rgue that dominant shareholders in a concentrated ownership
ontext limit the role of board’s ownership to control manage-
ent risky decisions. These ﬁndings have important implication in
he Spanish context, where several changes in the regulatory list-
ng requirements have been carried out with respect to corporate
overnance and where there is no empirical evidence regarding
his.
The rest of the article proceeds as follows: “Literature review and
ypotheses development” section presents a review of previous
iterature about the research issue and describes our hypotheses;
Methodology” section describes the process followed for sample
election and data capture, the statistical methodology and the
tudy model speciﬁcation; “Results” section reports the results and
urther analysis; and, the ﬁnal section includes the conclusions.
orporate governance and ﬁnancial distress. Literature
eview and hypotheses development
The relationship between corporate governance and ﬁnancial
istress is a matter of interest to different stakeholders. Proof of
his is the intense literature that has been developed on this subject
nd we refer this below.
wnership
The conﬂict of interests between management and other share-
olders is more severe in ﬁnancial distress situations. Management
ould make decisions aimed to obtain short-term personal ben-
ﬁts rather than to overcoming the ﬁnancial distress, due to the
nsecurity of their jobs (Donker et al., 2009). Under these cir-
umstances, the level of ownership of large shareholders and/or
irectors could contribute to reduce the management-shareholders
onﬂict of interests.
The problems associated to ownership concentration (free
ide and expropriation) have been widely discussed in previous
iterature (Claessens, Djankov, Fan, & Lang, 2002; La Porta, Lopez-
e-Silanes, Shleifer, & Vishny, 2000; Shleifer & Vishny, 1986).
owever, the situation is different when we  analyze the effect
f ownership concentration on corporate failure. In this situation,
arge shareholders could suffer great losses due to their partici-
ation in a ﬁnancial distressed company. In this sense, they are
xpected to exercise an important monitoring function on oppor-
unistic management behavior. In other words, large shareholders
ave sufﬁcient incentives to maximize ﬁrm value by reducing infor-
ation asymmetries and helping to overcome the agency problems
nd, ultimately, to the company recovery (Claessens et al., 2002).
Contrarily, some studies argue that in concentrated context, as is
he Spanish case, ownership concentration may  create information
symmetries between large and minority shareholders (Jensen,
993). So, large shareholders may  have inﬂuence on management
nd, therefore, guide it into their private beneﬁt regardless of the
nterests of minority shareholders (La Porta et al., 2000). In this case,
inority shareholders could suffer expropriation of their wealth,
nd consequently, ﬁnancial distress’ likelihood of companies will
ncrease (Lee & Yeh, 2004).
According to this, the effect of ownership concentration on
nancial distress likelihood is unclear. However, following Lee and
eh’s (2004) study in ownership concentration context we  expect
hat greater ownership concentration increases the likelihood of
nancial distress (Donker et al., 2009; Elloumi & Gueyie, 2001;ish Accounting Review 19 (1) (2016) 111–121 113
Mangena & Chamisa, 2008; Parker et al., 2002). In other words, we
analyze whether the ownership concentration increases the share-
holders’ problems to monitor management and the likelihood of
ﬁnancial distress:
H1. Firms with high ownership concentration have high likeli-
hood of ﬁnancial distress.
Along with this, some studies analyze the effect of institutional
investors (banks, insurance ﬁrms, pension funds, mutual or trust
funds) on ﬁrm survival. They point out their effectiveness as corpo-
rate governance mechanism to monitor management (Blair, 1995;
Daily, 1995) and their focus on long-term performance rather than
the short-term or annual term as management does (Donker et al.,
2009). So, it is expected that in a concentrated ownership context,
where other corporate governance mechanisms may be ineffec-
tive, the institutional investors take an active role to control the
management. Contrarily, other authors point out lack of expertise
of institutional investors to advising management (Gillan & Starks,
2000) and their incentives to act passively against management
when they have business relationships (Donker et al., 2009), as
factors that can affect their monitoring effectiveness. According to
these arguments, the empirical evidence is also mixed. Daily and
Dalton (1994b), Firth, Chung, and Kim (2005) and Mangena and
Chamisa (2008) found a negative relationship between institutional
investors and ﬁnancial distress likelihood. Contrarily, Donker et al.
(2009) report a positive association of both variables. Based on that,
we investigate two  alternative hypotheses regarding the impact of
institutional ownership concentration on the likelihood of ﬁnancial
distress.
H2a. Firms with high institutional ownership concentration have
less likelihood of ﬁnancial distress.
H2b. Firms with high institutional ownership concentration have
greater likelihood of ﬁnancial distress.
Furthermore, following the arguments of convergence theory
the participation of the board of directors in shareholding is also a
powerful incentive to achieve the alignment of their interests with
those of other shareholders (Shleifer & Vishny, 1997), that is, max-
imizing the value of shares. In this regard, Jensen (1993) argues
that many business problems occur because the members of the
board typically do not have large holdings of shares in the company
where they work. This situation discourages managers to take deci-
sion in order to maximize the value of shares, negatively affecting
the creation of business value. This argument is corroborated by the
study of Fich and Slezak (2008) who  reported a negative relatinship
between the proportion of shares held by the board and the prob-
ability of business failure. At the same line, Wang and Deng (2006)
and Liu, Uchida, and Yang (2012) argue that management holding
shares is linked to long-term value generation. So, on a sample of
Chinese companies, they found that those ﬁrms with greater man-
agement’s ownership had greater likelihood of survival in difﬁcult
situations. So, we  hypothesize that:
H3. Firms with high board ownership have less likelihood of ﬁnan-
cial distress.
Board of directors
The ability of the board to act efﬁciently has been regarded as
a determinant of businesses’ ﬁnancial distress. So, weak or poor
corporate governance increases the probability of opportunistic
behavior of management or controlling shareholders to act in their
own interest, extracting wealth from other shareholders (Johnson,
Boone, Breach, & Friedman, 2000; La Porta et al., 2000) and increas-
ing the likelihood of ﬁnancial distress. Consequently, the role of
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oard composition and structure (board independence and board
ize) on business ﬁnancial distress should be examined.
oard independence
The board independence is usually proxy through the separation
f the roles of the Chairman and the Chief Executive Ofﬁcer and the
umber of independent directors on the board.
eparation of the roles of the chairman and the chief executive
fﬁcer. Some researches argue that the separation of the roles
f the Chairman and the Chief Executive Ofﬁcer is required to
nsure the independence and effectiveness of the board (Baysinger
 Hoskisson, 1990; Jensen, 1993) and consequently to increase
he board monitoring effectiveness (monitoring hypothesis). Con-
rarily, other researches defend duality or accumulation of powers
f two ﬁgures in a single person (CEO duality) in post to achieve
trong leadership and control unit, facilitating the transmission
f information, reducing coordination costs and avoiding the
mergence of potential conﬂict of interests between the two  pos-
tions (Donalson & Davis, 1991; Davis, Choorman, & Donaldson,
997).
Regarding the relationship between duality and processes busi-
ess failure, the results of empirical studies developed about are
lso diverse. Daily and Dalton (1994b) and Simpson and Gleason
1999) reported a positive relationship between the dual power
nd the probability of bankruptcy, and Wang and Deng (2006) ﬁnd
 positive relationship only in the case of public administration-
ontrolled companies. By contrast, the results of Simpson and
leason (1999) show a negative relationship between the accu-
ulation of the ﬁgures of Chairman and CEO and the likelihood of
ncurring a situation of business failure. For its part, Chaganti et al.
1985) found no relationship between these two factors. According
o the monitoring hypothesis, we suggest that CEO duality increases
he risk of ﬁnancial distress.
4. Firms with CEO duality have high likelihood of ﬁnancial dis-
ress.
umber of independent directors. Agency theory advocates the
ndependence of the board as a measure to ensure an adequate
ontrol over the management. Thus, the work of outside directors
ill be to monitor and control potential opportunism and avoid
elﬁsh behaviors of management so that their decisions are con-
istent with the interests of shareholders (Fama & Jensen, 1983;
ensen, 1993; Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Also, the presence of
utside directors reduces the possible existence of information
symmetries and agency costs between shareholders and man-
gement (Chang, 2009; Daily, 1995; Fich & Slezak, 2008). Thus,
mpirical evidence (Brickley, Coles, & Terry, 1994; Weisbach, 1988)
hows that outside directors represent better the interests of the
hareholders than inside directors. On the contrary, some authors
rgue that outside directors do not have the knowledge about
he company and the sector, or do not have enough experience
o perform their jobs well (Baysinger & Hoskisson, 1990; Estes,
980).
Regarding the relationship between the presence of outside
irectors on the board and business failure, Gueyie and Elloumi
2001) and Wang and Deng (2006) conclude that ﬁrms with higher
roportion of outside directors are less likely to fail due to the fact
hat they are more efﬁcient in imposing the necessary measures to
elp overcome a possible failure situation (Fich & Slezak, 2008).
hang (2009) also indicates that the presence of outside direc-
ors on the board, in the long term, generates the development of
fﬁcient activities that will detect and monitor the possible emer-
ence of opportunistic behavior by the management in order to
void business failure. Meanwhile, Chaganti et al. (1985), Simpsonish Accounting Review 19 (1) (2016) 111–121
and Gleason (1999) and Lajili and Zéghal (2010) ﬁnd no relation-
ship between the proportion of outside directors on the board and
business failure. According to the agency theory, we hypothesize
that the proportion of independent directors is negatively related
to ﬁnancial distress.
H5. Firms with high proportion of independent directors have less
likelihood of ﬁnancial distress.
Board size
In this regard, in the previous literature, there are two dif-
ferent perspectives. On the one hand, previous studies (Chaganti
et al., 1985; Goodstein, Gautam, & Boeker, 1994; Judge & Zeithaml,
1992; Yemarck, 1996) have revealed some problems related to
the size of the board. In this sense, larger board may have prob-
lems with balance, resulting in greater discretion of its members
to meet their particular interests to the detriment of the general
interest of the company (Chaganti et al., 1985), involvement in
issues business strategy of its members, something that would
adversely affect business performance (Judge & Zeithaml, 1992;
Yemarck, 1996), or lack of effectiveness when turbulent economic
environments requires a change in strategic direction (Goodstein
et al., 1994). From this point of view, smaller boards and larger
percentage of independent or outside directors are more effec-
tive in the implementation of mechanisms for corporate control
(Jensen, 1993), thereby decreasing the chances of the company to
achieve unstable economic and ﬁnancial situations (Fich & Slezak,
2008).
Moreover, in contrast to above studies, the resource depend-
ence theory argues that larger boards offer various advantages
associated with the company’s ability to access the resources and
information held by the directors and that might be needed to
achieve the business objectives (Pearce & Zahra, 1992; Pfeffer,
1972). From this perspective, the size of the board would be nega-
tively associated with the likelihood of business failure.
Accordingly, two  different hypotheses have been tested:
H6a. Firms with high board size have less likelihood of ﬁnancial
distress.
H6b. Firms with high board size have greater likelihood of ﬁnan-
cial distress.
Methodology
Sample selection and data
In order to test the hypotheses proposed, we  collected data
from the Spanish listed companies excluding ﬁnancial companies,
due to the different features that these businesses have in rela-
tion to the regulatory standards, ﬁnancial reporting standards and
compliance (Manzaneque, Merino, & Banegas, 2011a; Manzaneque,
Merino, & Banegas, 2011b; Merino, Manzaneque, & Banegas, 2012).
We studied the time period from 2007 to 2012, for two  reasons:
ﬁrst, there were a large percentage of companies which published
their Annual Report in all of those years, and, second, we found
more companies which had more economic and ﬁnancial prob-
lems during this period. We  used a matched-pairs research design
(Elloumi & Gueyie, 2001; Hosmer & Lemeshow, 1989; Mangena
& Chamisa, 2008; Peasnell, Pope, & Young, 2001) for constructing
our sample. We  took all the ﬁrms that had a ﬁnancial distress sit-
uation for the period 2007–2012 and identiﬁed 164 observations
(ﬁrm/year) as ﬁnancial distressed with complete corporate gover-
nance and ﬁnancial data. According to the prior literature, each of
these ﬁnancial distress observations was  matched with not ﬁnan-
cial distressed observations which have a similar size (total asset),
same industry and the same accounting period (Beasley, 1996;
– Spanish Accounting Review 19 (1) (2016) 111–121 115
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angena & Chamisa, 2008; Peasnell et al., 2001). We  removed 10
nancial distress observations because no appropriate matching
ere found. The matching procedure resulted in a ﬁnal sample of
08 paired observations where 154 are distressed and 154 non-
istressed. We  also conducted a paired t-test whose results show a
orrect matching-pair. The sample is representative of population
ecause it collects a wide range of Spanish listed companies (see
ables 1 and 2).
Also, we have estimated the maximum allowable error for
 ﬁnite population test. The maximum error is small (e = 4.6%,
 = 95%) leading to the consideration that the sample is represen-
ative of the population.
Spanish context has been chosen due to speciﬁc characteris-
ics of corporate governance system in Spain: (1) is an example of
wnership concentration and thus serves as a reference for ana-
yzing the power of large shareholders in situations of ﬁnancial
istress (Claessens et al., 2002; Donker et al., 2009); (2) follows
 “unitary board system” where both executive and non-executive
irectors are included in only one board (Board of Directors), so
he level of independence to ensure the effectiveness of this organ
s important; and (3) corporate governance practices are based on
oluntary codes of conduct. Furthermore, it is an important con-
ext due to the increasing political pressure to encourage the level
f corporate governance system efﬁciency and to be adjusted to the
equirements and recommendations of the European Union on this
ssue.
The information about ﬁnancial data has been taken from
he Annual Accounts and the corporate governance information
ownership and board characteristics) from the Corporate Gover-
ance Annual Report. This information is available on the National
tock Exchange Commission (CNMV, Spain) web page.
Financial distress is deﬁned as the lack of company’s capacity
o satisfy its ﬁnancial obligations (Grice & Dugan, 2001; Grice &
ngram, 2001; Pindado et al., 2008). Thus, using an approximation
f the Pindado et al. (2008, 997) concept of business failure, we
onsider as ﬁnancial distress companies those that meet some of
he following conditions: (1) its earnings before interest and taxes
epreciation and amortization (EBITDA) are lower than its ﬁnancial
xpenses for two consecutive years; and/or (2) a fall in its market value
ccurs between two consecutive periods. Other previous studies on
usiness failure have used those proxies (see Manzaneque (2006)
or a major revision). Under this approach, we  have constructed a
inary dependent variable that takes the value 1 if the company
eets one of the above criteria and 0 otherwise.
As independent variables, and following the previously exposed
heoretical and empirical approaches, we use ﬁve independent
ariables related to ownership and board composition and struc-
ure: ownership concentration (OWNERSIG), board ownership
OWNERD), CEO Duality (CEOD), proportion of independent direc-
ors (PID) and board size (BS). These variables are described in
able 3.
est speciﬁcation
Conditional logistic regression analysis is applied to estimate
he ﬁnancial distress likelihood. Following Mangena and Chamisa
2008) we applied this methodology for two  main reasons: (a)
he conditional logistic regression overcomes the limitations of
rdinary least squares (OLS) to estimate the parameters when
he dependent variable is dichotomous, as is the case (Hosmer
nd Lemeshow, 1989; Tabachnick and Fidell, 1996); and (b) this
ethodology preserves the marched character of the sample
Hosmer and Lemeshow, 1989).
Following Pindado et al.’s, (2008) model, which includes only
nancial variables (proﬁtability, ﬁnancial expenses and retained Ta
b
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Table  2
Sample distribution by year.
Sample distribution by year
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 Total
N % N % N % N % N % N % N %
Non-distressed companies 29 50 19 50 27 50 28 50 20 50 31 50 154 50
Distressed companies 29 50 19 50 27 50 28 50 20 50 31 50 154 50
58  100 38 100 54 100 56 100 40 100 62 100 308 100
Source: Authors’ own.
The table summarizes the frequency and percentage of non-distressed and distressed companies on the sample along the study period.
Table 3
Deﬁnition and expected signs variables.
Deﬁnition Abbreviation Expected signs
Dependent variable
Financial distress Variable dummy  which takes value 1 when company is
ﬁnancial distress and 0, otherwise.
We  consider a company as “distressed” when meets some of
the  following conditions: (a) its earnings before interest and
taxes depreciation and amortization (EBITDA) are lower than
its  ﬁnancial expenses for two consecutive years; and/or, (b) a
fall in its market value occurs between two consecutive
periods.
FD
Independent variables
Economic and ﬁnancial variables
Proﬁtability Earnings before interest and taxes to total assets on the
beginning of the period (EBITt/RTAt-1)
PROF −
Financial expenses Financial expenses to total assets on the beginning of the
period (FEt/RTAt-1)
FE +
Retained earnings Total reinvested earnings or losses of a ﬁrm over its entire life
to  total assets on the beginning of the period (REt-1/RTAt-1)
RE −
Corporate governance variables
Ownership variables
Ownership concentration Percentage of shares owned by large shareholders (large
shareholders are those that owns three percent or more of
shares)
OWNERSIG +
Institutional ownership
concentration
Percentage of shares owned by institutional large shareholders
(large shareholders are those that owns three percent or more
of  shares)
OWNERSIG 1 +/−
Non-institutional ownership
concentration
Percentage of shares owned by non-institutional large
shareholders (large shareholders are those that owns three
percent or more of shares)
OWNERSIG 2 +/−
Board  ownership Proportion of shares owned by the board of directors OWNERD −
Board  characteristics variables
CEO duality Dummy  variable which takes value 1 when both roles are held
by  the same person and 0, when they are not
CEOD +
Independent directors Proportion of independent outside directors on the board of
directors
PID −
Board  size Number of members in the board of directors BS +/−
Match  variables
Firm size Corporate size measured by the logarithm of total assets LOGTA −
Industry 1. Oil and energy
2. Basic materials, manufacturing and construction
3.  Consumer goods
4. Consumer services
5. Technology and telecommunications
INDUSTRY
S
e
t
w
c
o
eource: Authors’ own.
xpenses) our econometric model includes corporate governance
oo and it is expressed as follows (Model 1):
FD = ˇ0 + ˇ1EBITit/RTAit−1 + ˇ2FEit/RTAit−1 + ˇ3REit/RTAit−1
+ ˇ4 OWNERSIGit+
ˇ5OWNERDit + ˇ6CEODit + ˇ7PIDit + ˇ8BSit + dt + ni + uit
(1)here: FD = Financial distress (measured as a dummy  variable
oded one if ﬁrm was considered as distressed and zero in
ther case); EBITt/RTAt−1 = Proﬁtability (earnings before inter-
st and taxes to total assets on the beginning of the period);FEt/RTAt−1 = Financial expenses (to total assets on the beginning of
the period); REit/RTAt−1 = Retained earnings (total reinvested earn-
ings or losses of a ﬁrm over its entire life to total assets on the
beginning of the period); OWNERSIGt = Ownership concentration
(measured as the percentage of shares owned by shareholders with
at least 3% holding); OWNERDt = Board ownership (measured as
the percentage of shares owned by members of the board of direc-
tors); CEODt = CEO duality (measured as a dummy  variable which
takes value 1 when chair and Chief Executive Ofﬁcer are the same
person and 0, when they are not); PIDt = Proportion of indepen-
dent outside directors on the number of members in the board of
M. Manzaneque et al. / Revista de Contabilidad – Spanish Accounting Review 19 (1) (2016) 111–121 117
Table  4
Sample statistics summary.
Variable Mean Median 25th 75th Std. dev.
Economic and ﬁnancial variables
PROF 0.051 0.030 −0.003 0.086 0.113
FE  0.020 0.014 0.005 0.029 0 .021
RE  0.371 0.250 0.089 0.603 0.402
Corporate governance variables
OWNERSIG 0.460 0.444 0.200 0.652 0.332
OWNERSIG 1 0.207 0.143 0.042 0.313 0.204
OWNERSIG 2 0.252 0.143 0.042 0.313 0.293
OWNERD 0.231 0.139 0.009 0.432 0.240
PID  0.344 0.333 0.235 0.458 0.181
BS  11.500 11 9 14 3.370
Companies
CEOD
Coded 1 62.00%
Coded 0 38.00%
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he table summarizes the mean, median, percentile 25th, percentile 75th and stand
irectors; BSt = Board size (measured as the number of members
n the board of directors); dt = Time effect; ni = Individual effect;
it = Random disturbance.
Also, we re-estimate the model with the split of OWNERSIG
ariable into institutional (OWNERSIG 1) and non-institutional
wnership concentration (OWNERSIG 2) (Model 2) with the objec-
ive of studying the impact of institutional investors ownership
oncentration on the likelihood of ﬁnancial distress.
esults
escriptive analysis and univariate test
Table 4 presents the summary descriptive statistics variables
or the entire sample in order to analyze its characteristics.
able 5 provides the main statistics for both groups (distress and
on-distressed observations) and the test of mean differences sig-
iﬁcance.
The results in Table 4 indicate that large shareholders control
6% of the shares, which means a concentrate ownership environ-
ent. At the same time, the great board ownership is noteworthy
23%), which indicates the alignment of interests between owner-
hip and board of directors according to the convergence theory.
nstitutional and non-institutional investors have a similar mean
articipation in both shareholding (OWNERSIG 1, 0.207; OWNER-
IG 2, 0.252). Regarding board composition variables, the results
ndicate that the mean proportion of independent directors is
round 34% of total board members and its mean size is around
2 members. The CEO duality occurs in the 62% of the analyzed
ompanies.
Table 5 reports descriptive statistics for distressed and non-
istressed companies. Distressed companies tend to have smaller
roﬁtability – mean (median) of 2% (1%) compared with 8% (6%)
 and retained earnings – mean (median) of 34% (21%) compared
ith 40% (28%) – than non-distressed companies. Contrarily, and
ccording to the expected, distressed companies have more ﬁnan-
ial expenses, with a mean (median) of 2.3% (1.7%) compared to 1.7%
1%) for non-distressed companies. For corporate governance vari-
bles related to ownership, the results reveal a lower proportion of
hares owned by large shareholders for non-distressed companies,
ith a mean (median) of 42% (39%) compared to 50% (48%) for dis-ressed companies. By contrast, the board of directors’ ownership is
reater for non-distressed companies with a mean (median) of 25%
15%) and 22% (13%), respectively. Regarding the participation of
nstitutional and non-institutional investor, only the participationeviation for entire sample. Variables are described in Table 3.
of non-institutional large shareholders is signiﬁcant and greater for
distressed companies (distressed companies OWNERSHIG 2 mean,
0.283; non-distressed companies OWNERSHIG 2 mean, 0.221). As
for the variables related to board structure, the non-distressed com-
panies tend to have more independent board (36.3% of member
of the board), with a slightly large size (near to 12 members) and
where they are more likely to have a same person as CEO and chair-
man  (64.29%), than distressed companies (32.4% of independent
member of the board, a mean board size of 11 members and CEO
duality in 59.74% of cases).
The t test indicates that there are systematic differences
between the distressed and non-distressed companies with respect
to Proﬁtability (PROF), Financial expenses (FE), Retained earn-
ing (RE), Ownership concentration (OWNERSIG), Non-institutional
ownership concentration (OWNERSHIG 2), and proportion of inde-
pendent directors (PID).
Additionally, we examine the multicollinearity between the
independent variables through the Spearman’s rho correlations
(see Table 6). The results allow us to rule out the possible existence
of multicollinearity between the variables in the studied model, and
its consequences on the regression analysis, because although there
are some signiﬁcant correlations all are below 0.4 (Tabachnick and
Fidell, 1996).
Conditional logistic regression. Results
Table 7 presents the results obtained after the application of
the conditional logistic-regression analysis. Two  main models are
presented (Models 1 and 2). In Model 1 we test the inﬂuence of eco-
nomic and ﬁnancial variables and corporate governance variables
on the likelihood of ﬁnancial distress. In Model 2 we re-estimate
the above model with the split of ownership concentration vari-
able into institutional and non-institutional investors participation
in shareholding.
The results of Model 1 support the hypothesis of relationship
between ﬁnancial distress likelihood and board ownership (OWN-
ERD), proportion of independent directors (PID) and board size
(BS).
The coefﬁcient indicates that board ownership (OWNERD) has
a negative inﬂuence on ﬁnancial distress likelihood, which is con-
sistent with the ﬁndings of Deng and Wang (2006) for the Chinese
market or Karamanou and Vafeas (2005) although contradicting
that obtained by Mangena and Chamisa (2008). According to this
result, ownership of shares by board members could be an appro-
priate measure of corporate governance in order to control the
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Table  5
Mean comparison test for distressed and non-distressed companies.
Variables Distressed companies Non-distressed companies Test Z-value
Mean Median 25th 75th Std. dev. Mean Median 25th 75th Std. dev.
Economic and ﬁnancial variables
PROF 0.021 0.008 −0.012 0.053 0.104 0.081 0.057 0.011 0.101 0.113 5.64***
FE 0.023 0.017 0.006 0.031 0.024 0.017 0.010 0.004 0.025 0.017 −2.50***
RE 0.342 0.209 0.079 0.584 0.378 0.399 0.276 0.132 0.603 0.425 1.70**
Corporate governance variables
Continuous variables
OWNERSIG 0.502 0.478 0.227 0.696 0.368 0.419 0.392 0.192 0.609 0.289 −1.93**
OWNERSIG 1 0.199 0.137 0.031 0.286 0.206 0.232 0.151 0.051 0.336 0.201 −0.40
OWNERSIG 2 0.283 0.162 0.031 0.479 0.325 0.221 0.121 0.001 0.390 0.253 −1.66**
OWNERD 0.215 0.124 0.009 0.384 0.226 0.248 0.152 0.008 0.460 .251 0.86
PID  0.324 0.333 0.222 0.444 0.161 0.363 0.333 0.250 0.500 0.197 1.85**
BS 11.344 11 9 14 3.263 11.656 11.000 9.000 14.000 3.478 0.42
Categorical variables
Distressed Companies Non-Distressed Companies Chi-square value
CEOD
Coded 1 59.74% 64.29%
0.66Coded 0 40.26% 35.71%
Source: Authors’ own.
This table compares mean values of economic and ﬁnancial variables and corporate governance variables between two groups: Distress companies and non-distress com-
panies.  Mean differences are calculated as ﬁnancial distress (1) and non-ﬁnancial distress (0). A ﬁrm is classiﬁed as distressed companies when it meets one of the following
conditions, ﬁrst, its proﬁtability is lower than its ﬁnancial expenses for two consecutive years, or, second, a fall in its market value occurs between these two periods. For
each  variable, the table reports the number of observations and the values of the following statistics: mean, median, percentile 25th, percentile 75th, standard deviation and
T  test of difference of means (Chi-square value for categorical variables).
The bold text shows signiﬁcant coefﬁcients.
* Signiﬁcant at the 10 percent level.
** Signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level.
*** Signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level.
Variables are described in Table 3.
Table 6
Correlation matrix.
FD PROF FE RE OWNERSIG OWNERSIG 1 OWNERSIG 2 OWNERD CEOD BI PINS PNONINS
PROF −0.26***
FE 0.14 −0.11**
RE −0.09 0.01 −0.13
OWNERSIG 0.07 −0.01 0.03 −0.05
OWNERSIG 1 −0.03 0.04 0.06 −0.05 0.07
OWNERSIG 2 0.10** −0.08 0.05 −0.10** 0.51*** −0.26**
OWNERD −0.06 −0.01 0.07 −0.13** −0.11** −0.09* −0.10**
CEOD −0.04 0.12** −0.18*** 0.14** −0.02 −0.02 −0.10*** 0.05
PID  −0.11** 0.01 −0.13** 0.22*** −0.04 −0.17*** −0.08 −0.17*** 0.18***
BS −0.04 −0.01 0.16*** −0.23*** −0.06 0.22*** −0.03 −0.08 0.06 −0.13 0.27*** 0.11**
Source: Authors’ own.
A  ﬁrm is classiﬁed as distressed companies (FD) when it meets one of the following conditions, ﬁrst, its proﬁtability is lower than its ﬁnancial expenses for two consecutive
years,  or, second, a fall in its market value occurs between these two  periods. FD takes value 1 for distressed companies and 0 in other case. The number in the table is t-value.
The  bold text shows signiﬁcant coefﬁcients.
* Signiﬁcant at the 10 percent level.
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*** Signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level.
ariables are described in Table 3.
ctions and interests thereof. In turn, the Agency Theory provides
hat stock ownership by directors encourage the alignment of their
nterests with those of shareholders. So, the hypothesis H3 is sup-
orted.
For the variable proportion of independent directors (PID) we
btain the same relationship, the estimated coefﬁcient is negative
nd thus consistent with the expected sign. Companies with more
roportion of independent directors have less likelihood to suf-
er a ﬁnancial distress situation, thus accepting H5. This result is
onsistent with Wang and Deng (2006), Hiu and Jing-Jing (2008)
nd Mangena and Chamisa (2008), highlighting the importance of
ndependent boards to monitoring and control management deci-
ions, especially those affecting the company survival. The effect
f Board size (BS) on ﬁnancial distress likelihood is negative, sup-
orting the hypothesis H6a. However, this result is contrary tothat obtained by Lajili and Zéghal (2010) or Mangena and Chamisa
(2008), those who  do not ﬁnd a relationship between board size
and distressed companies. This is consistent with the argument of
the Resources Dependency Theory (Pearce and Zahra, 1992; Pfeffer,
1972), according to which companies with more size board have
the ability to control management and to access the resources and
information. Also the board of directors may  represent a broad
range of interests and point of view, reducing the ﬁnancial distress
likelihood.
The coefﬁcient of the variables ownership concentration (OWN-
ERSIG) and CEO duality (CEOD) are not signiﬁcant, and thus our
hypotheses are not supported (H1, H4). In the ﬁrst case, the coef-
ﬁcient is positive suggesting that the ﬁnancial distress likelihood
increases with ownership concentration. This would suggest that
large shareholders are passive as regards an enhanced monitoring
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Table 7
Conditional logistic regression models.
Variables Predicted sign Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8
Economic and ﬁnancial variables
PROF − −5.842 (1.370)*** −5.736 1.381*** −5.780 (1.389)*** −5.731 (1.386)*** −5.704 (1.379)*** −5.651 (1.375)*** −5.677 (1.369)*** −5.608 (1.363)***
FE + 14.724 (7.417)** 15.469 (7.529)** 17.319 (7.654)** 17.840 (7.662)** 15.261 (7.383)** 15.767 (7.393)** 15.503 (7.399)** 16.099 (7.410)**
RE − −0.001 (0.003) −0.001 (0.001) −0.203 (0.333) −0.192 (0.332) −0.149 (0.329) −0.132 (0.329) −0.111 (0.328) −0.093 (0.328)
Corporate  governance variables
OWNERSIG + 2.570 (4.500) – 0.220 (0.522) – 0.106 (0.511) – 0.078 (0.509)
OWNERSIG 1 +/− − −0.434 (0.691) − −0.378 (0.703) −0.479 (0.695) −0.555 (0.605)
OWNERSIG 2 +/− − 0.281 (0.469) − 0.576 (0.590) 0.433 (0.579) 0.422 (0.574)
OWNERD − −1.240 (0.572)*** −1.279
0.589**
−1.035 (0.541)* −0.989 (0.540)* −1.014 (0.535)* −0.987 (0.536)* −0.989 (0.532)* −0.973 (0.533)*
CEOD + 0.361 (0.275) 0.369
0.275
0.417 (0.289) 0.426 (0.289) 0.354 (0.280) 0.368 (0.281) 0.333 (0.278) 0.352 (0.278)
PID  − −1.401 (0.731)** −1.487
0.742***
−1.453 (0.726)** −1.463 (0.727)** −1.424 (0.720)** −0.987 (0.536)** −1.373 (0.716)** −1.393 (0.718)**
BS +/− −0.079 (0.040)** −0.077
0.040**
−0.003 (0.008) −0.070 (0.039)* 0.020 (0.204) 0.001 (0.208)
BS2 – – – – −0.003 (0.008) −0.003 (0.008)
BS  > 15 −0.715 (0.419)* −0.708 (0.422)*
Year dummies No No Yes Yes No No No No
Number of observations 308 308 308 308 308 308 308 308
−2  log likelihood −170.966 −170.966 −151.433 −150.630 −152.192 −151.398 −151.499 −151.438
Model  2 40.56*** 41.31*** 39.07*** 40.67*** 37.55*** 39.14*** 38.93*** 39.05***
McFadden R2 0.118 0.121 0.114 0.119 0.109 0.115 0.114 0.114
Nagelkerke R2 0.730 0.736 0.715 0.731 0.702 0.717 0.699 0.716
Source:  Authors’ own.
The variables are described in Table 3. Standard error is reported in parentheses. In bold, signiﬁcant coefﬁcients.
* Signiﬁcant at the 10 percent level.
** Signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level.
*** Signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level.
McFadden R2 o Pseudo R2 is a measure of the goodness-of-ﬁt of the model that is equivalent to the R2.
Pseudo R2 = [(−2LLnull − (−2LLfull)]/ − 2LLnull,
where −2LL is the likelihood value and where the null model is the one including only the constant.
Nagelkerke is a test of goodness-of-ﬁt distributed as R2.
Model 2 is a statistical signiﬁcance test, the model is signiﬁcant if the probability is less than 0.05.
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n management, alternatively, they do not have enough incentives
o hold back the ﬁnancial distress. So, our results are consistent with
ther empirical evidence (Elloumi and Gueyie, 2001; Lee and Yeh,
004; Mangena and Chamisa, 2008; Parker et al., 2002). Second,
he variable CEO duality (CEOD) shows the expected sign (positive)
lthough results are not signiﬁcant as in the Mangena and Chamisa
2008) study. This result is consistent with the Daily and Dalton
1994a) and Hiu and Jing-Jing (2008) studies.
In Model 2, when institutional (OWNERSIG 1) and non-
nstitutional (OWNERSHIP 2) large shareholders variables are
ncluded in the ﬁnancial distress prediction models, the results
how that this aspect is not signiﬁcant for the study context. So,
ontrary to the previous empirical evidence (Lee and Yeh, 2004;
angena and Chamisa, 2008), institutional investors seem to be
assive to monitoring the management activities in Spain; thus, the
ypotheses H2a and H2b are not supported by the results. These
esults could be attributed to the fact that institutional investors
o not have enough power or incentives to make the ﬁrms perform
ell (Edelen, 2001; Fich and Slezak, 2008).
urther analysis
In order to test the robustness of the results some further anal-
ses have been developed. First, since the economic situation is
ifferent each year, this situation can also inﬂuence on ﬁrms’ fail-
re likelihood (Foster, 1986; Lev and Thiagarajan, 1990). Models 3
nd 4 (Table 7) have been developed including year dummies to
ontrol that effect. However, the results remain unchanged so, in
his case, the different economic situation present in all years of the
tudied period have no inﬂuence on business failure.
Second, the literature supports the idea that more members on
he board contribute to the diversity of criteria and improve its
fﬁciency (Dalton, Daily, Johnson, & Ellstrand, 1999) and indepen-
ence (Pearce and Zahra, 1992). Nevertheless it also accepts that
arge boards have greater coordination and information problems
ecause there is less speed and efﬁciency in the decision-making
rocess (Jensen, 1993; Lipton and Lorsch, 1992). According to
hat, some literature suggests a nonlinear relationship between
oard size and performance (among others, Yermack, 1996 and
aramanou and Vafeas, 2005) and consequently also with business
ailure likelihood. To test this possibility the BS squared variable
as been included into the Models 5 and 6. In these cases the vari-
ble BS is positive but non-signiﬁcantly related to business failure
ikelihood.
Finally, a dummy  variable has been created to control those
bservations that have boards with more than ﬁfteen members
Models 7 and 8), over the recommendation in Uniﬁed Code of Good
overnance (Comisión Nacional del Mercado de Valores, 2006) to
panish companies. The results show the same negative relation-
hip between that new variable and business failure likelihood. In
ummary, these analyses suggest that our results are robust.
onclusions
This paper extends prior empirical research on ﬁnancial distress
nd corporate governance mechanisms ﬁlings in geographical con-
ext like Canada, U.S., China and UK to Spain, where overall analysis
f this issue is still lacking. Spanish companies’ ownership distribu-
ion and corporate governance system characteristics (ownership
oncentration, large directors’ ownership, widespread CEO duality
ractice and large board size) more likely raise the agency prob-
ems and, therefore, they could contribute to worsening situations
f ﬁnancial distress. We  investigate the effect of Spanish corporate
overnance mechanisms on the likelihood of ﬁnancial distress.ish Accounting Review 19 (1) (2016) 111–121
The results show that corporate governance mechanisms as
board ownership, proportion of independent directors and board
size reduce the ﬁnancial distress likelihood. However, ownership
concentration, institutional or non-institutional large shareholders
and CEO duality have no signiﬁcant impact on ﬁnancial distress
likelihood. So, our research offers some important implication for
the empirical literature about how corporate governance mech-
anisms inﬂuence on ﬁnancial distress likelihood. First, our study
provides empirical evidence on the relationship between corporate
governance mechanisms and ﬁnancial distress likelihood for the
Spanish context where it is non-existent. Second, this paper offers
empirical evidence regarding the negative relationship between
board size and ﬁnancial distress likelihood. Often, emphasis has
been put on the need to reduce the size of boards, though in this
case the evidence shows that more size could contribute to a greater
diversity of opinion or, alternatively, improved access to informa-
tion and increased the ability to control the management. Thirdly,
institutional investors are not shown to be effective as mechanisms
of corporate governance in the study context, contrary to the results
of other researches. This raises important issues regarding what fac-
tors condition the exercise of power by institutional investors and
what kind of interests they are what keep on the company. This
analysis could shed light on the factors that contribute to avoid the
company ﬁnancial distress.
Although our results have several implications for corporate
governance and ﬁnancial distress literature, there are some lim-
itations and unobservable issues. First of all, due to the focus on
our study we have some obvious internal and external control
mechanisms as General Meeting of Shareholders, the sharehol-
ders’ activism, board training and professional experience, board
diversity, the design of compensation contracts of directors or
other measures of ownership concentration reﬂecting the effective
shareholder control over the company. Second, the sample period is
not long enough to study some issues as causality of variables and
endogeneity problems. Third, we should go into detail about the
reasons that lead to institutional investors to take a passive role in
management control and monitoring to get over ﬁnancial distress.
Future research could analyze these issues to better understand the
complexity of the ﬁnancial distress process and their causes.
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